Thailand’s Political Turmoil Deepens as Another Prime Minister Falls

On 29 August 2025, the Constitutional Court dismissed Paetongtarn Shinawatra as prime minister on the grounds of violating ‘ethical standards’ after a controversial leaked phone call with former Cambodian leader Hun Sen in June. She is the fifth prime minister to be removed by the Constitutional Court in 17 years, underscoring a pattern of judicialization in Thai politics, where the court has played a decisive role in shaping political outcomes.

The dismissal of Paetongtarn immediately resulted in the removal of her cabinet and triggered the selection of a new prime minister. Soon after the court’s verdict, the Bhumjaithai Party—formerly the second-largest member of the Pheu Thai–led coalition before its removal from government in June—announced its readiness to form an interim government.

Although Bhumjaithai does not command a majority in the House of Representatives, the People’s Party, a successor to the dissolved Move Forward Party that had won the 2023 election, has emerged as a pivotal actor in the selection of the new prime minister. The People’s Party declared that it would not join a coalition government but would remain in opposition on the condition that any new government be short-term—lasting only four months—to pave the way for fresh elections. It also demanded that a constitutional referendum be held to establish a constituent assembly tasked with drafting a new constitution.

Bhumjaithai quickly accepted these conditions in exchange for votes to support its leader, Anutin Charnvirakul, as the next prime minister. Pheu Thai later also received the conditions, hoping to persuade the People’s Party to back its own third prime ministerial candidate Chaikasem Nitisiri, despite the collapse of the post-2023 election coalition memorandum of understanding. As of now, the People’s Party has not committed to either bloc, wary of the reputational risks and potential backlash among its support bases.

Technically, there are five potential prime ministerial candidates at present, as the constitution stipulates that each political party must nominate up to three candidates before an election. Eligible candidates must come from parties holding at least 25 seats in the House of Representatives. Beyond Anutin Charnvirakul of Bhumjaithai and Chaikasem Nitisiri of Pheu Thai, the list also includes Pirapan Salirathavibhaga and former junta leader Prayut Chan-ocha of the United Thai Nation Party, as well as Jurin Laksanawisit of the Democrat Party.

The People’s Party’s decision to offer its votes for the selection of a prime minister—while refusing to join a coalition—is widely seen as a strategic maneuver to block Prayut Chan-ocha from returning as prime minister in this interim government. At present, Thai politics is effectively divided into three blocs: the former coalition led by Pheu Thai, the challenger bloc led by Bhumjaithai, and the game-changing People’s Party. Neither Pheu Thai nor Bhumjaithai commands a majority, leaving the People’s Party with enough seats to determine which side can secure the premiership.

Prayut Chan-o-cha is a former army general who led Thailand’s 2014 coup, ruled for nearly a decade as prime minister, and became known for his authoritarian style and military-backed governance. Photo: AMC

While the outcome remains uncertain and the People’s Party has yet to decide, speculation in Thai media has grown that Pheu Thai and Acting Prime Minister Phumtham Wechayachai may consider dissolving the House and calling a new election. This follows mounting pressure from the People’s Party, which has refused to back either bloc or has effectively blocked Bhumjaithai from securing enough votes for the premiership.

However, such a move is highly contentious. For months, legal experts and political commentators have debated whether an acting prime minister has the authority to dissolve the House and call an election. This would be unprecedented in Thailand and is rarely seen even in other parliamentary democracies. The risks for Pheu Thai are considerable. First, the legality remains unclear: while some scholars argue it could be done, the Secretary-General of the Council of State recently warned that an acting prime minister lacks constitutional authority to dissolve the House. Second, even if dissolution were permitted, Pheu Thai would face an uphill battle in a new election, as its popularity has fallen to its lowest level in decades. If this scenario were to unfold, the constitution requires that a new election be held within 45 to 60 days.

The Constitutional Court’s ruling on Paetongtarn has also deepened doubts about the future of Pheu Thai and the Shinawatra family in Thai politics. For now, the branding of both Pheu Thai and the Shinawatras has been weakened, with popularity declining after two years in office marked by few concrete achievements to campaign on. The conflict with Cambodia has further complicated matters, as many Thais perceive it less as a state-to-state dispute and more as a personal clash between the Shinawatra and Hun families—one that has already dragged the country into deadly confrontations.

What is increasingly clear is that the Shinawatras no longer command the political weight they once had two decades ago. Adding to the uncertainty, the Supreme Court is set to rule on the 9th of September  regarding Thaksin’s prolonged hospital stay to avoid imprisonment. Should the ruling go against him, it could mark the beginning of the end for the Shinawatra dynasty in Thai politics, with Pheu Thai gradually fading in influence.

Thailand once again stands at a critical juncture. If an interim government is successfully formed, it is unlikely to last more than a few months before dissolving the House and paving the way for new elections. In such a scenario, the interim government will face significant challenges in addressing pressing issues such as U.S. tariffs or the ongoing Thailand–Cambodia conflict. Policy direction is unlikely to shift meaningfully; instead, the government will focus on domestic matters that can be framed as short-term achievements to campaign on in the next election.

Even if an early dissolution occurs, new elections would still produce familiar outcomes. Thai politics remains locked in a recurring pattern: fragmented party systems leading to fragile multi-party coalitions, while the courts and independent agencies continue to exert outsized influence. Political instability and the judicialization of politics appear set to persist in Thailand.

 -Asia Media Centre