Anutin's Leadership: Thailand’s Four-Month Test

On September 5, 2025, Anutin Charnvirakul, leader of the Bhumjaithai Party—the third-largest party in the House of Representatives—was elected as Thailand’s 32nd prime minister. His election followed the Constitutional Court’s dismissal of former prime minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra. Although Anutin secured a majority of votes in the House, it is technically a minority government. This is because the People’s Party, the successor to the dissolved Move Forward Party, which won the 2023 election, supported Anutin’s candidacy under the terms of a memorandum of agreement between the two parties, but declined to join the coalition formally.

The Bhumjaithai-led minority government was made possible by a memorandum of agreement between the People’s Party and the Bhumjaithai Party, which set specific conditions for supporting Anutin’s premiership. First, the House of Representatives must be dissolved within four months, ensuring that Anutin serves only as a transitional leader before a new election is called. Second, Bhumjaithai must initiate a constitutional referendum. Third, Bhumjaithai must remain a minority government and refrain from seeking a majority in the House; the party’s current coalition holds only 146 MPs, well short of a majority. Finally, the People’s Party will remain in opposition and not join the coalition. This agreement ultimately enabled Anutin’s election as prime minister, as he secured the backing of the People’s Party, the single largest bloc in the House, despite their decision not to formally enter government.

The new cabinet line-up reflects a mix of at least four groups of ministers. The first consists of “outsider” technocrats appointed to key strategic ministries such as Foreign Affairs, Energy, Finance, and Commerce. Their inclusion is intended to project an image of professionalism and expertise to both domestic and international audiences.

The second group comprises veteran politicians, representing Thailand’s traditional patronage politics in which cabinet portfolios are allocated to coalition partners and faction leaders. A third notable group is the so-called “Buriram Connection,” consisting of ministers closely associated with Newin Chidchob, the influential power broker behind the Bhumjaithai Party.

Finally, in the sphere of security affairs, two portfolios have been entrusted to military generals, particularly with responsibilities related to managing disputes along the Thai–Cambodian border. Overall, this cabinet line-up reflects both short-term objectives—boosting the government’s popularity ahead of the election—and the distribution of political rewards to coalition partners, while leaving security matters firmly in the hands of military figures.

In its policy statement to Parliament, the Anutin government outlined four key priorities. First, addressing economic challenges by easing the public’s financial burden, including through the continuation of co-payment schemes. Second, strengthening national security, particularly in light of the ongoing dispute with Cambodia, which the government intends to resolve through a combination of military and diplomatic measures. Third, enhancing preparedness for natural disasters by improving prevention mechanisms and early warning systems. Fourth, tackling social threats by intensifying efforts against all forms of illegal activity.

In addition, the Anutin government pledged to remain in office for only 120 days, after which it would dissolve the House of Representatives and call for a new election. A constitutional referendum is also scheduled to be held on the same day as the election.

Additionally, the government will hold another referendum to annul the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Thailand and Cambodia. These policy priorities reflect a “quick win” strategy, enabling Bhumjaithai to maintain power in the short term and showcase tangible achievements within four months that can be leveraged in the next election campaign.

If Anutin follows through on his pledge to remain in office for only four months, the dissolution of the House is likely to take place by late January 2026.

According to the constitution, a new election must then be held within 45 to 60 days, which would place the next Thailand’s general election by late March or early April 2026. In addition, a constitutional referendum is expected to be held on the same date as the election if Parliament passes the constitutional amendment to establish a constituent assembly by the end of 2025, as well as a referendum to cancel the two Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) between Thailand and Cambodia. It was confirmed during a parliamentary session for the policy statement on 29 September that Thai voters will be given four ballots in next year’s election.

However, Bhumjaithai also faces controversies surrounding two major legal cases that could undermine its popularity and erode public trust. The first is the Khao Kradong case in Buriram, in which the court ruled that land belonging to the State Railway of Thailand had been unlawfully occupied and exploited by private individuals.

These lands are linked to the influential Chidchob family, which has long been regarded as the real power brokers behind the Bhumjaithai party. Several ministers associated with Newin Chidchob have since faced questions over their impartiality, making this case a critical test for the Anutin government. The second is the 2024 Senate vote-rigging scandal, which allegedly involved hundreds of senators as well as executives of the Bhumjaithai Party. Together, these two cases represent a crucial test of accountability and will determine whether the public can place its trust in Anutin and Bhumjaithai’s leadership.

As the four-month timeframe intensifies ahead of the election, the latest NIDA Poll released on 28 September shows a highly fluid political landscape. A significant 27.28% of respondents remain undecided on their preferred choice for prime minister. Support for opposition leader Natthaphong Ruengpanyawut of the People’s Party fell to 22.80%, while Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul’s popularity rose sharply from 9.64% to 20.44%. In terms of party support, the People’s Party dropped from 46.08% to 33.08%, while 21.64% of respondents said that no party was suitable. Meanwhile, Bhumjaithai’s support edged up from 9.76% to 13.24%.

These figures suggest that voter preferences remain highly volatile, leaving ample room for parties to gain additional support in the lead-up to the election. Anutin and the Bhumjaithai Party appear keenly aware of this dynamic and are banking on a “quick win” strategy to boost their standing within the next four months. The trajectory of Thai politics during this period should be closely watched, as the landscape remains fluid and subject to rapid change.

-Asia Media Centre

*The opinions expressed are those of the author