Calm Words, Choppy Waters: Can ASEAN and China Finally Deliver a South China Sea Code of Conduct?

Meeting in Manila for the 59th ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting (AMM), ASEAN foreign ministers and China reaffirmed their commitment to completing negotiations, with both sides expressing optimism that the long-awaited agreement could finally be concluded before the end of the year.

For the Philippines, which is chairing ASEAN in 2026, delivering the Code of Conduct has become one of its most significant diplomatic priorities.

“On the South China Sea, what was given attention is the code of conduct that ASEAN and China are geared towards… hopefully the conclusion of the code of conduct by the end of this year,” said Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Ma. Theresa Lazaro during her media briefing at the International Media Centre.

Lazaro also said negotiations have accelerated this year, with negotiators meeting every month since January, reflecting the parties’ shared commitment to finalise the agreement. “I think you know very well that we have monthly meetings. These negotiations have not been done this way,” she said.

“Since the start of January, there have been monthly meetings of the negotiators, and this is now part of the political will that we intend to finish this code of conduct by the end of the year,” she added

The Foreign Affairs chief noted that one of the key areas of progress is the growing consensus on the principle of self-restraint, which forms part of the agreement’s terms of reference.

Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Theresa Lazaro stressed that the proposed COC remains anchored on the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), respects the rights of third parties, and seeks to establish rules governing conduct and behavior at sea.

The optimism was echoed by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who also expressed confidence that negotiations were moving in the right direction during discussions with ASEAN leaders in Manila.

Although claimant states continue to hold different legal and political positions over the South China Sea, both ASEAN and China have publicly signalled a willingness to push negotiations towards completion after more than two decades of discussions.

According to a statement released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China following a meeting between Wang Yi and ASEAN Secretary-General Kao Kim Hourn in Manila:

“China is ready to work with ASEAN countries to remove disruptions, accelerate consultations on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC), jointly create a new narrative of peace, stability, cooperation and friendship in the South China Sea, and keep the initiative over the South China Sea issue firmly in the hands of our regional countries.”

Yet while diplomats were discussing cooperation inside Manila's conference halls, events unfolding in the South China Sea served as a reminder of how fragile that progress remains.

Just days before the official opening of the Foreign Ministers' Meeting, Philippine and Chinese personnel were involved in another confrontation near Second Thomas Shoal, where the BRP Sierra Madre remains grounded. The ageing World War II vessel was deliberately beached by the Philippines in 1999 to reinforce its presence in the disputed waters and has since become a symbol of Manila's claim within its 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), an area that also falls within China's broader claim in the South China Sea.

The incident was followed by two separate encounters near Scarborough Shoal, where Chinese vessels used water cannon against Philippine government ships. Both Manila and Beijing lodged diplomatic protests against one another and released their own footage of the confrontations, each accusing the other of provoking the incidents.

Top: Philippine Coast Guard photo showing the Chinese Coast Guard using a water cannon against a Philippine fisheries vessel near Scarborough Shoal. Bottom: Images released by the Chinese Embassy in Manila, which claimed the Philippines deliberately provoked the incident to capture it on camera.

Rather than becoming isolated maritime encounters, the incidents quickly became part of the diplomatic conversations taking place in Manila. Although the ASEAN meetings covered a broad range of regional and global issues, from Myanmar and transnational crime to developments in the Middle East and Ukraine, the South China Sea inevitably remained one of the most closely watched issues, particularly as ASEAN and China were simultaneously discussing the future Code of Conduct.

For ASEAN, the timing was difficult to ignore. The organisation was projecting renewed confidence that one of its longest-running diplomatic negotiations was entering its final stages. At the same time, the confrontations at sea demonstrated the very challenges the proposed Code is intended to address. The irony was striking: negotiations appeared to be gathering momentum precisely as tensions on the water once again escalated.

International attention

The maritime incidents also featured prominently in discussions among ASEAN's dialogue partners during the Foreign Ministers' Meeting.

United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio raised the South China Sea during his visit to Manila, reiterating Washington's commitment to maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific and emphasising the importance of managing differences responsibly. While much of his bilateral meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi focused on broader US-China relations, the South China Sea remained a key issue shaping regional security discussions.

The issue took on greater urgency after a third maritime incident on Thursday, July 16, when the Chinese Coast Guard used a water cannon against a Philippine fisheries vessel. Speaking to reporters on the sidelines of the ASEAN meetings, Rubio said, “The whole world saw it, and it's disturbing.”

"We have a role, and we're not going to abandon our allies. We've made that abundantly clear,” he added.

The US State Department later described China's actions as "dangerous and provocative".

In an opinion piece published in the Philippine media on Tuesday, Rubio argued that the South China Sea faces “dire new threats” if it were to “fall under the control of a power willing to use commerce as a geopolitical weapon”.

Australia also reaffirmed its long-standing support for international law and the peaceful resolution of disputes.

Speaking to reporters in Manila, Foreign Minister Penny Wong said Australia remained concerned about actions that increase tensions and raise the risk of miscalculation in the South China Sea.

Canberra has consistently maintained that any future Code of Conduct should be consistent with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and should not diminish the rights of states under existing international law, which she said, “all countries should observe it both in spirit and in the letter of the law.”

Wong continued, “We are concerned about some of the destabilising conduct we are seeing [in the South China Sea]. And the countries of the region have a choice to make about how we all respond to that. And Australia believes we should respond to that by working for peace and stability, by continuing to call for and encouraging compliance with the observation of international law and of safe and professional conduct at sea and in the air.”

China's foreign ministry accused Australia of "exaggerating tensions and inciting confrontation" over the South China Sea, after Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong criticised Beijing for blaming the Philippines over a recent maritime incident.

The European Union also welcomed the progress made in negotiations, expressing support for ASEAN and China reaching an effective Code of Conduct while reiterating the importance of resolving disputes peacefully and in accordance with international law. During the same series of meetings, the EU also elevated its relationship with the Philippines to an Enhanced Partnership, further underscoring the bloc's growing engagement in the Indo-Pacific.

For New Zealand, the position has remained consistent. Wellington has long supported ASEAN centrality, freedom of navigation and overflight, and the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with UNCLOS. While New Zealand does not take positions on competing sovereignty claims, successive governments have consistently encouraged efforts to conclude an effective and substantive Code of Conduct that contributes to regional stability and a rules-based regional order.

China, however, has pushed back against what it sees as growing involvement by external powers in the South China Sea. Beijing has repeatedly argued that disputes should primarily be managed by countries directly concerned and has criticised attempts to involve non-claimant states in issues it considers regional in nature. During meetings in Manila, Chinese officials reiterated that position while also expressing support for continuing negotiations with ASEAN.

The differing perspectives reflect one of the broader challenges facing negotiators. While ASEAN has welcomed support from its dialogue partners for a rules-based regional order, China continues to argue that the Code of Conduct should remain an ASEAN-China process.

 As negotiations enter what many hope will be their final stretch, balancing those competing expectations may prove almost as challenging as resolving the incidents unfolding at sea.

Over two decades in the making

For many outside the region, the idea of ASEAN and China negotiating a Code of Conduct may sound like a routine diplomatic exercise. In reality, it has become one of the longest-running and most complicated negotiations in Southeast Asia.

The idea dates back to 2002, when ASEAN and China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). At the time, the declaration was hailed as an important confidence-building measure. It committed all parties to resolve disputes peacefully, exercise self-restraint and avoid actions that could complicate the situation. It also recognised the need for a more comprehensive Code of Conduct in the future.

More than twenty years later, that future agreement remains unfinished.

The reason is simple: while all parties agree that tensions in the South China Sea should be managed peacefully, they have very different ideas about how that should happen.

One common misconception is that the proposed Code of Conduct will settle the overlapping territorial and maritime claims in the South China Sea. It will not.

Ownership of disputed islands, reefs and other maritime features will remain contested regardless of whether the Code of Conduct is completed this year, a point experts from the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative and the Lowy Institute have consistently made for more than a decade.

Instead, negotiators see the agreement as a framework for managing behaviour rather than resolving sovereignty.

The objective is to establish clearer rules for how countries should interact when their coast guards, naval vessels or fishing fleets encounter one another in disputed waters.

By improving communication and setting expectations, the Code aims to reduce the risk of misunderstandings, prevent incidents from escalating, and lower the possibility of accidental conflict.

For a region where maritime encounters have become increasingly frequent, supporters argue that those practical measures could be just as important as any legal or political breakthrough.

Fiery Cross Reef, one of China's artificial islands in the South China Sea. Since 2013, Beijing has created more than 3,200 acres of new land through large-scale reclamation in the Spratly Islands and expanded its presence in the Paracel Islands.

Progress has often been overtaken by events

If the negotiations have lasted more than two decades, it is partly because developments at sea have repeatedly overtaken progress at the negotiating table.

Since the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties was signed in 2002, the South China Sea has changed significantly. China has expanded its coast guard presence, reclaimed land and built military facilities on several features in the Spratly Islands.

Other claimant states have also strengthened their maritime capabilities and increased patrols in waters they consider part of their exclusive economic zones. At the same time, extra-regional powers, including the United States, Australia, Japan and several European countries, have become more engaged in promoting what they describe as a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.

The legal landscape has also evolved.

In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled in favour of the Philippines, finding that China's expansive "nine-dash line" claim had no legal basis under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Beijing rejected the ruling, maintaining that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction and insisting it would neither recognise nor implement the award.

The arbitration did not end the dispute. Instead, it added another layer of complexity to the negotiations.

For the Philippines, the ruling remains an important legal foundation underpinning its maritime rights in the West Philippine Sea. China, however, continues to reject it. Any future Code of Conduct therefore has to navigate two very different legal and political realities without attempting to resolve the sovereignty question itself.

Several analysts argue that this has made negotiations considerably more difficult. Every new maritime incident, every diplomatic protest and every disagreement over international law inevitably shapes the level of trust between the parties, even if those issues are technically separate from the text under negotiation.

What the Code should really look like?

Even if ASEAN and China agree on the need for a Code of Conduct, they do not necessarily agree on what the final document should contain.

One of the most significant differences centres on whether the agreement should be legally binding.

The Philippines and Vietnam have consistently supported a legally binding Code that would create stronger obligations for all parties and provide greater confidence that commitments made during negotiations would be respected in practice. Supporters argue that without legal force, the agreement risks becoming little more than another political declaration, similar to the 2002 DOC, which encouraged restraint but lacked any mechanism to ensure compliance.

China has generally favoured a less prescriptive approach.

Beijing has publicly supported completing the Code but has indicated that the agreement should remain a political understanding rather than a legally binding treaty. Chinese officials argue that flexibility allows countries to manage disputes through dialogue and consultation while preserving the confidence necessary for long-term cooperation.

Neither position is without merit.

A legally binding agreement could provide greater certainty but would likely take longer to negotiate and prove more difficult to implement. A political declaration may be easier to conclude, but critics question whether it would meaningfully change behaviour during future confrontations at sea.

Finding a compromise acceptable to all parties has become one of the most difficult aspects of the negotiations.

The ASEAN Leaders' Summit will be held in Manila in November 2026, where regional leaders are expected to gather. ASEAN and China also hope to conclude negotiations on the Code of Conduct (COC) at the summit.

ASEAN's own diversity also shapes the negotiations

Although negotiations are often portrayed as a discussion between ASEAN and China, ASEAN itself does not speak with one voice on every aspect of the dispute.

The Philippines and Vietnam have experienced repeated confrontations with Chinese vessels and have generally taken a firmer public position on maritime issues. Malaysia, while also a claimant state, has traditionally adopted a quieter diplomatic approach. Brunei rarely comments publicly on the dispute, while Indonesia is not a claimant to the Spratly Islands but has become increasingly active in defending its maritime rights around the Natuna Islands.

Those differing national interests inevitably influence ASEAN's negotiating position. Reaching consensus among the ten member states is often as important as reaching agreement with China.

That is why ASEAN officials have consistently described the Code of Conduct as a consensus-based process rather than a negotiation driven by any single claimant state. The Philippines may hold the ASEAN Chair this year, but any final agreement must ultimately reflect the collective position of the organisation as well as China's acceptance.

Against that backdrop, Secretary Lazaro's confidence that negotiations could conclude this year reflects not only progress between ASEAN and China, but also growing confidence that ASEAN itself may be moving towards a common position on several of the remaining issues.

Whether that optimism is enough to overcome the unresolved legal and political differences, however, remains to be seen.

 -Asia Media Centre