What Washington and Beijing Each Want from the Trump-Xi Summit

When Xi Jinping steps off his plane at Joint Base Andrews in the United States today, President Trump will be there to meet him. Trump, in an unprecedented gesture, will greet Xi on the tarmac, followed by a flyover of a B-2 bomber and four F-22 fighters. The three-day program includes an arrival ceremony on the White House South Lawn, a military review in the Rose Garden, a state dinner and a visit to the National Archives.

Beijing has framed the trip in historic terms. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said the two leaders' reciprocal visits within six months carry historic, milestone significance, and that China is willing to work with the U.S. to manage differences and deepen cooperation. Many Western analysts are more restrained. Edgard Kagan of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) expects a visit "heavy on optics and symbolism but light on substantive progress."

Both leaders face political deadlines at home. Trump is less than six weeks from the midterm elections, while Xi returns to a year-long political buildup to next fall's Communist Party Congress. The CSIS analysis adds that a successful visit would strengthen Xi's position going into the party's Fifth Plenum in October, where the next group of Chinese leaders will be discussed.

This week's Washington summit serves as a direct reciprocal follow-up to the May meeting in Beijing, aimed at formalising a temporary trade truce and continuing bilateral negotiations on trade, technology, and Taiwan. Photo: Wikipedia

How each side frames the relationship

The two governments describe the relationship in different language, and that framing shapes how each approaches the talks.

Beijing's framing. At the May summit in Beijing, the two leaders agreed to build what China calls a "constructive China-US relationship of strategic stability," which China's state-run Global Times describes as a new foundation for relations over the next three years and beyond. In an editorial ahead of the visit, the paper argued that competition between major powers is normal but should not define the whole relationship, and that each gain in predictability reduces anxiety in global markets. The Global Times reflects the official line rather than independent opinion, so it is best read as a signal of what the Chinese government wants.

Chinese academics who advise the government are cautiously upbeat. Wu Xinbo, director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai, expects the leaders to reaffirm the "strategic stability" framework and hopes for progress on military-to-military exchanges and a regular AI dialogue.

He noted that if the leaders also meet at APEC and the G20, they will have met four times this year, which he called unprecedented, and said stable trade ties would send a positive signal to markets. His Fudan colleague Wei Zongyou described China's steady, non-confrontational approach as "you fight your way, I'll fight mine," and argued that Washington cannot stop China's development through suppression or containment.

Washington's framing. American analysts often describe the same framework as a diplomatic strategy. Melanie Hart of the Atlantic Council argues that Beijing is trying to fit the Trump administration into a framework that would limit U.S. actions and make Washington more predictable, much as it tried with its "new type of great power relations" pitch to the Obama administration. Meanwhile, according to Hart, the administration has privately said its goal for the pause is to buy time to reduce China's control of rare earth supply chains, after which it plans to take tougher action. Beijing is aware of this and working to prevent it.

Where the two views meet. Both sides believe time is working in their favor. Trump expects the U.S. to take a commanding lead in AI while China's economy slows, and Xi sees the U.S. in accelerating decline. That shared confidence has produced a much calmer relationship than most people predicted a year ago. Ruby Osman of the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change says both leaders find stability useful so they can focus elsewhere: Iran for Trump, and building China's domestic resilience for Xi.

Voices inside China are not uniform, either. Radio Free Asia, which is funded by the U.S. government, interviewed Chinese scholars speaking under pseudonyms for safety reasons. One political scientist argued that a high-profile reception in Washington would help Xi show his dominance over personnel decisions and diplomacy ahead of next year's Party Congress. Another independent scholar noted that bringing business leaders on a foreign trip breaks with the party's approach over the past decade, since several prominent entrepreneurs were jailed in the post-2020 crackdown.

The trade truce

Background: The current calm rests on the "trade truce" agreed in Busan, South Korea, in October 2025, in which the U.S. agreed to hold off on new tariffs and China agreed to keep rare earths and critical minerals flowing. The truce expired on November 10.

Washington's position: Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent rejected Beijing's request for a two-year extension and reportedly offered six months instead. U.S. officials say China has only fulfilled about two-thirds of its rare earth commitments and describe a shorter extension as a compliance period.

Beijing's position: China wants a longer, more predictable arrangement. As the Global Times put it, the key question is whether the U.S. can turn the leaders' consensus into concrete action and manage differences.

Hart expects a six-month extension, which could be revisited in December if the leaders meet again at APEC and the G20. CSIS's Scott Kennedy argues that the U.S. assumed heavy unilateral pressure would force Chinese concessions, and that it did not work. He summarized the result as Washington now living in Xi Jinping's world. Wu Xinbo, speaking to Reuters, offered the Chinese perspective in one line: "China-US ties have become more transactional."

Tariff cuts and purchases: soybeans, beef and Boeing

Background: Chinese purchases of American goods matter politically to Trump, especially in farm states. But after the May summit, Trump announced Chinese purchases of 200 Boeing jets and new farm commitments, and Beijing declined to confirm them.

State of play: Hart says tariff reductions are nearly certain under a "30 by 30" deal in which each side removes tariffs on $30 billion of imports. Washington wants faster purchases of beef and soybeans before the midterms, while Beijing wants approval for $30 billion of low- or zero-tariff exports that it believes it was promised in May.

CFR's Rush Doshi thinks Boeing orders may be held back by disputes over aircraft parts, since Beijing does not want Washington to control a chokepoint in its aviation sector. Hart points out that Beijing can re-announce or formalize its May purchase pledges and effectively get credit twice. Reuters reports that the broader trade picture favors China: its global trade surplus is on track to exceed $1 trillion for a second straight year, and more than half of the roughly 6,500 product categories it sells to the U.S. have grown compared with 2025.

Rare earths and tech restrictions: who broke the truce?

Background: Rare earths are metals essential to electric motors, electronics and weapons, and China dominates their processing. This is where the two sides' accounts differ most sharply.

Washington's account: In July, the Federal Communications Commission banned new foreign-made advanced robots and power inverters, products China mainly exports. China then retaliated against many U.S. companies in August, and its rare earth exporters began cancelling U.S. shipments. From the U.S. view, China is using its supply advantage as leverage.

Beijing's account: China's Commerce Ministry called the FCC measures discriminatory despite being described as neutral, and said the U.S. was stretching the idea of national security and ignoring business communities on both sides. The ministry also said China had shown restraint and made repeated complaints that the FCC ignored. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning added: "Protectionism will not enhance US competitiveness." From Beijing's view, Washington escalated first and China responded.

Hart notes that both sides blame each other for breaking the Busan truce. She expects the familiar pattern to continue, with Washington describing a firm Chinese commitment to restore exports and Beijing using vaguer diplomatic language.

The Mountain Pass Rare Earth Mine & Processing Facility is the only active and scaled rare earth mining and processing facility in the United States. The facility is owned by MP Materials. Photo: Wikipedia

Artificial Intelligence: rivalry, accusations and a possible hotline

Background: Both governments see AI as a strategic technology that will reshape the economic and military balance of power. Both worry about safety, but they fear different things, which makes cooperation difficult. The issue has moved to the top of the agenda in recent days. Xi is reportedly bringing Chinese AI executives to the state dinner, and Trump is doing the same.

The distillation dispute. On September 8, the NSA, CISA and FBI accused six Chinese firms, including DeepSeek, Moonshot AI, Alibaba, MiniMax, StepFun and Z.AI, of copying capabilities from American models such as Claude, GPT, Gemini and Grok through a technique called "distillation." The advisory said this likely happened with the Chinese government's awareness. The same day, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said: "The Chinese distill our models and they can never get ahead of us." China's Commerce Ministry replied that distillation is a normal technique used by AI developers worldwide, including American ones, and warned it would take countermeasures if Washington used the issue to target Chinese companies.

Chips and computing power. Export controls on advanced chips are arguably the core of the rivalry, even though Treasury and trade officials appear to have kept them out of the AI dialogue. Washington has licensed Nvidia H200 sales to about ten Chinese firms, but very few appear to have shipped, as Beijing steers buyers toward domestic suppliers such as Huawei. Beijing still objects to restrictions on the powerful chips it needs to train its own models. In Congress, a bipartisan Remote Access Security Act would close loopholes that let Chinese companies rent U.S. computing power through data centers in third countries. For its part, Beijing hopes the summit will bring further easing of U.S. export controls on advanced chips and related technology.

Different definitions of "safety." Washington wants Chinese AI companies to adopt stronger safeguards and be more transparent about safety testing. It worries that weaker protections in Chinese models could help rogue actors launch cyberattacks or build biological weapons. Beijing's top concern is political. China's Minister of State Security Chen Yixin warned this month that hostile forces could use deepfakes and AI-generated content to wage propaganda campaigns against China. Beijing also worries that the most advanced American AI could be used against its critical infrastructure. The two sides share one narrow concern: that rogue actors could use AI for catastrophic cyberattacks or bioweapons that neither government would support.

Mixed signals from Washington. The U.S. position on safety is not fully consistent. CFR's Rush Doshi notes that Trump called AI risk a "hoax" just last week, which weakens any U.S. case for joint safeguards. ABC reported that Trump rejected a push for AI rules in his UN General Assembly speech this week. According to Doshi, Beijing is unlikely to adopt parallel regulations if it believes the U.S. move away from regulation is permanent.

Beijing's position. China says it is open to dialogue on its own terms. Its Commerce Ministry says China is willing to hold constructive, professional talks through the AI dialogue the two leaders agreed on, based on equality and mutual benefit. According to CSIS's Edgard Kagan, Beijing may accept a modest dialogue as long as it does not lock in U.S. advantages or require China to disclose details of its AI work. Chinese scholars quoted by RFA say Beijing prefers AI governance involving all countries and rejects security concerns as an excuse to cut China off from technology. Doshi also notes that China has taken some regulatory steps of its own and appears increasingly concerned about "extreme loss of control" among its top AI risks.

What could be agreed. Bessent, U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer and Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng have agreed to an AI dialogue and possibly a crisis communication line for AI. Bessent says the next meeting will likely be in about two months, probably in Shenzhen. Washington has also proposed a "notification mechanism" so each side knows whom to contact about dangerous AI incidents with national security implications. Pre-summit talks in New York were aimed at preparing possible agreements on AI guardrails.

Views on what the dialogue can achieve split roughly along national lines. On the Chinese side, Fudan University's Wu Xinbo expects progress toward a regular AI dialogue mechanism. American analysts are more cautious. Doshi, who helped negotiate the 2023 U.S.-China AI talks, points out that this dialogue was arranged by Treasury and trade officials rather than the agencies that actually handle AI safety. He also recalls that China did not send the right officials to the 2023 talks, and those it did send did not speak. It remains unclear whether either government will regulate its own industry, or which Chinese office would answer an AI hotline, given that past U.S.-China crisis channels failed during earlier emergencies. The Atlantic Council's Melanie Hart expects continued positioning throughout the summit and, at best, an agreement to keep working toward a more constructive AI dialogue.

Taiwan: Beijing's top priority

Background: Taiwan is a self-governing democracy that Beijing claims as its territory. The U.S. keeps unofficial ties with Taiwan and is required by law to provide it with the means to defend itself. Taiwan's government rejects Beijing's sovereignty claims. A 1982 U.S.-China joint communiqué stated a U.S. intention to gradually reduce arms sales, while a separate set of U.S. assurances to Taiwan that same year said Washington would not consult Beijing on those sales.

Beijing's position: The Global Times calls Taiwan "the most important issue between China and the US" and warns that mishandling it could lead to confrontation or even conflict. Reuters reports that Xi is expected to press Trump to halt arms sales under the 1982 communiqué, possibly during their visit to the National Archives. Wu Xinbo described a clear trade-off: if Washington addresses China's concerns on Taiwan, Beijing would be willing to address U.S. concerns on issues like law enforcement or farm purchases.

Washington's position: Formal U.S. policy has not changed, but Trump has sent mixed signals. In May, he said he was discussing pending arms sales with Xi and said "the last thing we need right now is a war that's 9,500 miles away." He has called a pending $14 billion arms package for Taiwan a "negotiating chip." In Congress, however, Republican John Moolenaar, who chairs the House Select Committee on China, urged Trump to reject Chinese objections to arms sales outright.

Hart warns that delaying arms sales could weaken deterrence and make the Taiwan Strait less safe. Kagan says Taiwan's leaders believe the best outcome they can hope for is no further erosion of the status quo. Some Chinese voices also urge caution: a Chinese government source told RFA that the conditions for attacking Taiwan are not yet in place and that Xi's priority is maintaining political stability.

The geopolitical tension in the Taiwan Strait centres on disputed sovereignty between the China and Taiwan, creating a heavily monitored maritime flashpoint that impacts regional military stability and global technology supply chains. Map: Wikipedia

Iran and the Strait of Hormuz

Background: The U.S. war with Iran and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, through which about a fifth of the world's oil and LNG normally passes, hang over the summit. China is Iran's largest trading partner.

Washington's position: Trump will likely ask China to cut off funds to Iran and push Tehran to reopen the strait, and may ask it to stop sharing intelligence with Iran. He has, however, publicly played down evidence that Chinese entities provided targeting information linked to U.S. military deaths.

Beijing's position: China has repeatedly called for an immediate ceasefire and the free movement of commercial shipping through the strait. In May, Foreign Minister Wang Yi urged his Iranian counterpart to end hostilities and reopen the strait. Beijing has also criticized U.S. actions: in April, its foreign ministry said the U.S. blockade of Iranian ports would only escalate tension and threaten the fragile ceasefire. China's foreign ministry says it is unaware of a reported sanctions-evasion scheme involving Chinese trade with Iran.

Analysts on both sides see Iran as a problem for Washington. The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, a congressional advisory body, notes that China vetoed a UN Security Council resolution on defensive action to open the strait. Kagan expects Xi to warn against sanctions on Chinese banks and argue that such pressure would push oil prices higher.

Fentanyl and detained Americans: Beijing's goodwill gestures

Background: Fentanyl and detainees are different issues, but they play a similar role at the summit. Neither is central to the U.S.-China rivalry, yet both matter to Trump personally and politically, and both are areas where Beijing can offer relatively low-cost concessions in return for goodwill. In Busan, Washington halved its fentanyl-related tariffs in exchange for a Chinese crackdown on the chemicals used to make the drug. On detainees, Trump has raised cases at every meeting with Xi over the past year, and Beijing released Pastor Ezra Jin, jailed during China's 2025 crackdown on underground churches, in July after Trump raised his case.

Washington's position: Trump will likely press China to do more to stop the flow of fentanyl, building on cooperation that began in 2023. He is also expected to seek the release of U.S. citizens Min Zin and Chen Youlin, both designated "wrongfully detained" by the State Department, and may again raise jailed Hong Kong media owner Jimmy Lai. Lai was sentenced to 20 years in prison in February after a national security trial, and his son made a public appeal to Xi from Washington ahead of the visit. After the May summit, Trump said Xi described Lai's case as a difficult one. Congress is also pressing for the release of Ekpar Asat, a Uyghur imprisoned more than a decade ago after taking part in a State Department exchange program.

Beijing's position: China presents counternarcotics as a success story. Its state-run Global Times lists it among the areas where the two countries have made progress since May. Beijing also appears to see these issues as bargaining chips. Fudan University's Wu Xinbo, who advises China's foreign ministry, told Reuters that if Washington accommodates China's concerns on Taiwan, Beijing would be willing to address U.S. concerns in other areas, including law enforcement.

Both issues are quieter than trade or Taiwan, but they could produce the summit's most visible surprises. CFR's Rush Doshi notes there has been real law enforcement cooperation on fentanyl since Busan, but no new commitments have been announced ahead of the visit, so any announcement this week may be symbolic. The Atlantic Council's Melanie Hart calls detainees the summit's wild card, because releasing high-profile prisoners is one of the easiest ways for Beijing to build goodwill at a time when goodwill is in short supply.

On September 22, US President Donald Trump and UK Prime Minister Andy Burnham discussed raising detained Hong Kong activist Jimmy Lai’s case with Xi Jinping. Trump may raise Lai’s release again when he meets Xi, having described the case as a “tough one.” Photo: Wikipedia

Chinese investment in the United States

Background: For years, the investment debate between the two countries centered on American companies operating in China. That is starting to change, as Chinese firms, especially in electric vehicles and clean technology, look to the U.S. market. At the same time, Washington has tightened restrictions on Chinese technology for security reasons. The U.S. has already blocked Chinese-made electric vehicles over security concerns and has recently imposed de facto bans on Chinese drones and robots.

Beijing's position: China wants signals that the White House will approve Chinese investment in electric vehicles, batteries, renewable energy and other technology. Xi is also traveling with a delegation of Chinese business leaders, potentially including companies under U.S. regulatory scrutiny that are seeking greater market access. More broadly, Beijing sees many U.S. restrictions as protectionism in disguise. China's Foreign Ministry has said it opposes what it calls the U.S. practice of abusing the concept of national security to suppress Chinese companies.

Washington's position: The U.S. side is divided. Trump told Fox News he would be "OK" with Chinese automakers building plants in the United States as long as they employ American workers. But the U.S. auto industry has pushed back, arguing such investment would mainly benefit Chinese companies, and cabinet officials and unions have also been cool to the idea. A senior official told the Financial Times the matter is not fully settled.

The complications. Resistance is not only on the American side. Chinese regulators and automakers have reportedly also been lukewarm, likely because of concerns about moving advanced technology and production abroad. Beijing has issued new State Council directives that effectively criminalize company decisions to move production out of China, which sits awkwardly with any plan for Chinese firms to build factories in the United States. Meanwhile, CSIS's Edgard Kagan notes that as the tariff gap between China and Southeast Asia narrows, companies have less reason to move production out of China at all, something Southeast Asian governments are watching closely.

Few analysts expect a breakthrough this week. Doshi notes that American cabinet officials and unions, along with Chinese regulators and automakers, have all been cool to the idea. He also urges caution about headline numbers: in 2017, China pledged $83.7 billion in investment in West Virginia, and none of it materialized. The most likely outcome is general language welcoming investment, with the harder questions of security reviews, technology transfer and local jobs left for later.

Other topics that could come up

Beyond the main agenda, several other issues could come up. Kagan expects Trump to raise North Korea, including his recent decision to scale back U.S.-South Korea military exercises, which Beijing has long called for, and his push for another meeting with Kim Jong-un. Trump is also likely to seek Xi's help with Russia's Vladimir Putin as Washington pursues a ceasefire in Ukraine.

Xi, for his part, is expected to offer better military-to-military communication and propose restarting an arms control dialogue suspended in 2024, and Beijing wants the visit to highlight people-to-people ties. The South China Sea is also in the background. Brian Wong, writing for the Hong Kong-based China-US Focus, says Beijing will use the talks to gauge whether U.S. policy is shifting there, and days before the visit Chinese state media again questioned Philippine sovereignty over the country's northernmost province.

Closely linked to this topic is the competition over undersea internet cables, which carry almost all international data traffic. On September 14, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency said it would fund a feasibility study for a new cable linking Thailand, the U.S., and five other Southeast Asian countries while avoiding the South China Sea, reflecting U.S. and allied fears that China could disrupt cables in a crisis. Beijing has said past cuts to Taiwan's cables were maritime accidents, and Chinese firms argue they are simply competing on price. None of these issues is expected to produce a formal agreement this week, but each could shape the tone of the talks.

The view from the region

Asian governments are also watching the summit closely. Kagan reports that some Indo-Pacific partners, once concerned that escalating U.S.-China tensions could lead to conflict, are now watching whether closer ties between Washington and Beijing could affect their room to manoeuvre or Chinese pressure in disputed waters. Chinese scholars have offered a different interpretation, with Wei Zongyou arguing that U.S. pressure on its European and Asian allies has contributed to growing disillusionment among some partners.

This shift in perceptions is also reflected in recent polling. Pew found that, for the first time in about two decades of polling, the median share of people across the countries surveyed who expressed a favourable view of China was slightly higher than the median for the United States.

New Zealand's own public perceptions show some parallels. The Asia New Zealand Foundation's 2026 Perceptions of Asia survey found that 35% of New Zealanders viewed the United States as a threat, while 49% viewed China as a friend.

The two governments are expected to assess the summit against different priorities. Washington is seeking progress on trade, rare earths and AI, while Beijing has emphasised the continuation of a “constructive China-US relationship of strategic stability” and its concerns over Taiwan.

The official readouts will provide an early indication of what the two sides say was agreed. After the May summit, Washington and Beijing issued different accounts of some commitments, including on purchases.

The summit is not expected to resolve the broader differences between the United States and China. Attention will instead turn to the agreements reached during the visit and how the two governments implement them in the months ahead.

-Asia Media Centre

Sources:

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