Takaichi Sanae and the Shifting Foundations of Japanese Politics

Two recent developments in Japanese politics may have significant long-term implications for the country’s political direction.

The first was the victory of Takaichi Sanae over Koizumi Shinjirō in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) presidential race. After some intense bargaining, Ms. Takaichi secured enough parliamentary votes to be elected Japan’s 66th prime minister and its first female premier.

Like the United Kingdom and New Zealand, Japan’s first female prime minister is by no means progressive. Following former prime minister Abe Shinzō’s murder in 2022, Ms. Takaichi quickly became the conservative standard bearer, consciously positioning herself as Mr. Abe’s political successor. To that end, Ms. Takaichi has frequently expressed opposition to “progressive” policies that have gained ground recently in Japan, such as a more open immigration policy, allowing separate surnames for married couples, legalizing same-sex marriage, and making changes to imperial household rules to allow a female emperor or matrilineal succession.

The LDP’s Internal Power Structure

The LDP itself is not a unified ideological bloc in the way New Zealand’s major parties are. Instead, it is structured around long-standing internal factions that compete for influence, cabinet portfolios, and leadership — shaping both policy direction and prime ministerial selection.

A Different Kind of “Iron Woman”

Though Ms. Takaichi frequently expresses her admiration for the “iron woman” herself, she differs from former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher in important ways. While Thatcher’s name is associated with fiscal austerity, anti-inflationary monetary policy, and deregulation, Ms. Takaichi favours looser fiscal and monetary settings to stimulate economic growth in a demographically challenged nation. Like Mr. Abe, she also supports intervention to bolster traditional industries (such as shipbuilding industry) and to ensure Japan is at the cutting edge of developing emerging technologies.

A Strong Start in Office

Two weeks into her term, Ms. Takaichi appears to be enjoying the type of honeymoon period not afforded to either of her two predecessors. She successfully brokered a new coalition with a party that is more ideologically aligned to the LDP than the centrist Kōmeitō. At the same time, she quelled broader concerns that she would govern based on factional interests and conservative instincts by including party rivals in her cabinet and assigning them important positions.

Ms. Takaichi was at the centre of the highly successful visit by President Donald Trump to Japan, where she took advantage of the welcome gift for Mr. Trump of accelerated defence spending (prepared by her predecessor) and made skilful use of her personal connections to Mr. Abe — one of the few leaders Mr. Trump got on well with during his first term. No doubt Mr. Trump’s strong endorsement (“This woman is a winner”) and Ms. Takaichi’s historic milestone have helped her start her premiership with some of the highest cabinet approval ratings in recent memory.

The End of the LDP–Kōmeitō Formula

The second major change precipitated the need for Ms. Takaichi to find a new coalition partner in the first place. In 1999, the LDP and Kōmeitō initiated an electoral arrangement where the two parties would endorse a single candidate for each single-member district (SMD) in the lower and upper houses. Both parties’ supporters would vote for that candidate while voting for their own party in proportional representation (PR) and/or multi-member districts.

This arrangement mainly worked because Kōmeitō’s core supporters belong to the lay Buddhist organization Sōka Gakkai, known for their discipline in vote splitting. Using the 2024 lower house election as an example, the support of Kōmeitō voters was likely the crucial difference in the LDP winning close to 20 percent of its SMD seats (137) and 13 percent of all seats (196). Kōmeitō’s true contribution to the coalition is closer to 50 lower house seats, rather than the 24 seats it actually won.

Why Kōmeitō Left

However, after 26 years, the “1999 System” came to a sudden — although not wholly unexpected — halt following the confirmation of Takaichi as LDP president. Kōmeitō as a party has long emphasized antimilitarism, social welfare, and “clean government” in its appeals to both the Sōka Gakkai faithful and the many floating Japanese voters attracted to the idea of Kōmeitō being a brake on the LDP’s most conservative impulses in government.

But over time, its core supporters grew frustrated as the party provided (reluctant) support for the passage of national security legislation in 2015, for increased defence spending, and for a more muscular defence posture overall. Coupled with the “money in politics” scandals that have beset the LDP since the end of the Abe era, Kōmeitō’s close association with the LDP began to hurt its ability to gather PR votes from both loyal and floating voters.

 Enter Ishin — and New Risks

Initially, Kōmeitō adopted a neutral stance towards the LDP even as it formally exited the coalition arrangement. However, Takaichi tying up with Kōmeitō’s mortal electoral enemy — the Osaka-based Nippon Ishin no Kai (Japan Innovation Party or Ishin) — will likely alienate Kōmeitō further as both parties compete aggressively for votes in the Kansai area of Japan, which includes the cities of Osaka, Kyoto, Kobe, and Nara (Ms. Takaichi’s home constituency).

Ishin is a reformist, decentralisation-oriented regional party that has built its identity around challenging traditional political establishments, though it often aligns with conservative positions on economic reform and defence.

 The High-Stakes PR Seat Gamble

The one policy compromise of national significance that Takaichi accepted in coalition negotiations with Ishin was an effective cut of close to 30 percent of the PR seats in the lower house. This proposal will make little difference to Japan’s fiscal situation and has not been something of public interest or debate. Ishin will be relatively insulated given its strength in Kansai’s SMDs; the target is clearly Kōmeitō, which relies heavily on PR votes. Other parties have labelled the proposal a “declaration of war”.

 What Happens Next?

This could backfire on the LDP in the long term. Using 2024 again as an example, if Kōmeitō’s most disciplined supporters had instead cast their votes for the largest opposition candidates in each SMD, the LDP’s SMD losses could have reached as high as 45 seats — 23 percent of all seats — making the LDP only the second-largest parliamentary party.

Could Ishin voters offset the electoral impact of the LDP losing Kōmeitō’s support? This will be difficult for multiple reasons. The LDP and Ishin ran overlapping candidates in 164 SMDs (out of 289) in the 2024 election, meaning large-scale candidate coordination would be required. Many promising candidates may not be willing to step aside.

Support for Ishin is more volatile outside Kansai and its changing voter profile will not vote strategically in the disciplined way Kōmeitō supporters did. Ishin lacks the nationally distributed, highly organised core that Sōka Gakkai provided Kōmeitō. Furthermore, Ishin has balanced itself as neither a ruling nor opposition party; aligning closer to the LDP may erode its appeal.

 A More Fragile Future

The LDP–Ishin arrangement may have a much shorter shelf life than the LDP–Kōmeitō one, and Ishin may be incentivised to leave the coalition at the first sign of weakening support for its own party. While expectations in Japan for both the first female prime minister and the new coalition are high, both will be more vulnerable than usual to missteps. While Takaichi’s cabinet support rate is high, support for the LDP itself remains lower than when her predecessor took over.

Takaichi’s best bet is to embrace Mr. Abe’s proactive approach to diplomacy while taking bold policy stances to prolong her honeymoon period beyond what is typical — and then call a snap election. Even then, with the end of the 1999 System, the continuation of stable, LDP-centred government in Japan may hinge more than ever on the personal popularity of the party’s leader.

-Asia Media Centre