Survival Diplomacy: Is the Philippines Rewriting Its Geopolitical Playbook?

The executive order cited the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a critical energy corridor for global oil shipments, as disrupting the flow of petroleum products to international markets and constraining global fuel supply. As a net importer of petroleum products, the Philippines remains highly dependent on external sources of fuel supply and is therefore vulnerable to disruptions in global oil production and transportation. That vulnerability, long acknowledged but never fully addressed, has now become an acute national crisis.

The Philippines imports 98 per cent of its oil from the Middle East. As of March 20, 2026, the Department of Energy reported the country had an average of 45 days' supply of oil, down from 55 to 57 days when the war started a month earlier. By March 24, fuel prices were projected to rise sharply, with diesel exceeding ₱130 (NZ$3.73) per liter and gasoline surpassing ₱100 (NZ$2.87) per liter.

The domestic fallout was immediate. Transport unions and Philippine senators criticised the government's response to the crisis, accusing the Marcos administration of lacking a unified and coordinated action to mitigate the fallout from the surge in oil prices.

The federation of public transport associations, Piston, described the energy emergency declaration as a measure that deliberately ignored the structural roots of the fuel crisis, calling instead for the immediate suspension of excise and value-added taxes on petroleum products. As of March 27, 425 filling stations across the country had closed, out of 14,485 stations nationwide being monitored by the Philippine National Police.

With its buffer dwindling and its streets restless, Manila moved - fast, and in directions that would have seemed improbable only weeks before.

The Russian Gambit

A ship carrying more than 700,000 barrels of Russian crude oil arrived in the Philippines days after the country declared a national energy emergency over the Middle East war. The Sierra Leone-flagged Sara Sky, bearing high-quality crude from Russia's ESPO pipeline, arrived last week, with documents showing the consignee as Petron Corp, operator of the Philippines' sole oil refinery.

The purchase, which would have been unthinkable before longtime treaty ally the United States eased sanctions tied to Russia's war in Ukraine, came as the import-dependent archipelago scrambled to expand its options in a suddenly volatile oil market.

Purchasing Russian oil was made possible after the United States Treasury Department authorised the delivery and sale of Russian crude and petroleum products loaded onto ships between March 12 and April 11.

Marcos confirmed the Russian purchase was being explored, saying: "Russia is not a traditional supplier of crude oil to the Philippines or any energy supply, but we are exploring that as well." The government has since confirmed the cargo covers supply needs through to the end of June, a meaningful but time-limited buffer.

Ateneo de Manila University economist Ser Pena Reyes offered a measured assessment of the move. He described buying the Russian crude, equivalent to about two days of national demand, as a pragmatic move that might help stabilise prices in the short term, but said ongoing geopolitical volatility made Moscow a less attractive long-term partner. "Russia can be a useful supplementary supplier... but the Philippines will likely benefit more from a balanced approach, maintaining strong ties with traditional partners while gradually investing in renewable energy and regional energy cooperation," he said.

Widening The Net

The Russian shipment is only one strand in a rapidly expanding diplomatic web. Marcos confirmed that talks are underway with India, Japan, South Korea, Brunei, and China to secure oil, saying: "We are talking to our trade partners like India, but we are also including other countries and are reaching out to China, Japan, Brunei and South Korea for possible supply arrangements."

Philippine Senator Sherwin Gatchalian, former chairman of the Senate Committee on Energy, said at a forum in Makati that the emergency declaration had to be done to "trigger" bilateral agreements with countries that the Philippines does not normally purchase oil from, like Russia, Latin America, and Canada. He noted the Philippines needs to secure contracts beyond 60 days, roughly how long existing fuel inventories and buffers can cover demand.

In an unprecedented step, the Philippines also moved to open direct dialogue with Iran, the very country whose blockade of the Strait of Hormuz triggered the crisis. Department of Foreign Affairs Secretary Maria Theresa Lazaro is set to meet with Iranian Ambassador Yousef Esmaeil Zadeh to discuss the safe passage of Philippine-bound oil ships through the Strait of Hormuz, now effectively under Tehran's control. Presidential Communications Undersecretary Claire Castro confirmed that President Marcos personally issued that directive.

For a treaty ally of the United States, now at war with Iran, the optics of that conversation are not insignificant.

The China Question

Of all Manila's new diplomatic forays, none carries higher stakes, or more complex implications, than its overtures toward China on joint energy exploration in the South China Sea.

In a Bloomberg Television interview, Marcos said he was open to restarting talks with China on joint oil and gas development in contested parts of the South China Sea, saying the war in Iran and the subsequent oil supply shock could provide an "impetus for both sides to come to an agreement" after years of friction in disputed waters.

The Philippines and China subsequently convened back-to-back the 24th Foreign Ministry Consultations and the 11th Meeting of the Bilateral Consultation Mechanism on the South China Sea on March 27-28 in Quanzhou City, in China's Fujian province. Both sides made "initial exchanges on potential oil and gas cooperation," the Department of Foreign Affairs confirmed.

Philippine and Chinese delegations meet in Quanzhou, China, for talks on the disputed South China Sea, March 28, 2026. Photo: Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs

The Chinese Embassy in Manila welcomed the development, with deputy spokesman Guo Wei saying that setting aside both countries' differences and pursuing joint development "is the right path to uphold peace and stability in the South China Sea." China stated it was prepared to resume dialogue as long as the Philippine side "demonstrates sincerity."

The legal terrain, however, is fraught. China claims nearly the entire South China Sea, a position rejected in 2016 by an international arbitration tribunal in The Hague, which ruled in favour of the Philippines. Beijing did not accept the ruling.

Any joint development arrangement risks being read as an implicit legitimisation of China's claims, a concern that Philippine officials have been careful to acknowledge publicly.

Experts urge caution about the practical and strategic dimensions of any deal. Analysts told Radio Free Asia that any cooperation between China and the Philippines to explore undersea oil reserves in disputed waters would be "a hedge for the next crisis, not a fix for this one." One analyst noted that while the Strait of Hormuz was once moving 20 million barrels a day, turning South China Sea gas fields into actual supply would take five to ten years of drilling, pipelines, and up to ten billion US dollars in investments.

Senator JV Ejercito was blunter still. He argued that even if joint exploration with China came to fruition, it would not immediately resolve the crisis, noting it would take "a minimum of five years" for oil to be extracted. "We're already in crisis now," he said.

The Diplomat noted the historical weight of the moment, pointing out that Marcos' openness to joint development represents a rupture with his administration's current policy toward maritime disputes with China. Since taking office, and especially in 2024 and 2025, Marcos has openly challenged China's claims in the South China Sea, fortifying security relations with the United States and introducing a "transparency" policy that publicised the aggressive actions of the China Coast Guard in the Philippines' exclusive economic zone.

The Alliance Question

The United States and the Philippines have been treaty allies since 1951.

Under Marcos, that relationship deepened considerably, with expanded access agreements for American forces and joint patrols in the South China Sea. What, then, does Manila's new diplomatic flexibility mean for that alliance?

The Council on Foreign Relations noted that the Philippines is in talks with the United States about obtaining permission to purchase oil from US-sanctioned countries, indicating that Washington remains in the loop, even as Manila shops beyond its traditional boundaries. The Russian purchase was enabled by a US waiver, not made in defiance of one. And Marcos has been at pains to frame his pivot as diversification, not abandonment.

Foreign Policy cautioned against over-indexing on the idea of a strategic tilt, noting the Philippines has also turned to Japan for fuel, and that popular anger at home is currently directed at Marcos rather than at Washington.

Still, the deeper structural question remains. Analysts tracking South China Sea policy point to the reemphasis of the US-Philippines alliance as the basis of the Philippines' balancing approach against China, under the Marcos administration, a posture that is now being tested by the raw arithmetic of energy survival.

The Malacañang Palace has attempted to hold both lines simultaneously. Presidential Communications Office Undersecretary Claire Castro said: "We will always be sincere in discussions, if there'll be any, and we will always be cautious in protecting the interest of the nation and of every Filipino. No interests will be lost, and none will be given away."

Survival vs Strategy

What Manila is navigating now is a tension familiar to many small and mid-sized nations: the gap between the long-term logic of alliances and the short-term imperatives of keeping the lights on and the fuel flowing.

The Philippines did not choose this crisis. It was made acutely vulnerable by a war started by others, fought in a region it depends on almost entirely for its energy imports. The emergency declaration, the Russian crude, the Iran dialogue, the China talks, each of these steps carries geopolitical risk. But the alternative, fuel rationing, grounded flights, darkened streets, and a population already striking, carries political risk of a different and more immediate kind.

Senator Gatchalian put the utilitarian logic plainly: the emergency declaration was needed to "trigger" bilateral agreements with countries the Philippines does not normally deal with. In a crisis, the rulebook gets rewritten. For Manila right now, the question is not which partners are ideologically comfortable, it is which ones have oil, and how quickly it can arrive.

What the coming months will reveal is whether this moment of energy-driven pragmatism hardens into a durable shift in Philippine foreign policy, or whether it remains a crisis detour before Manila returns to its established course.

-Asia Media Centre