South Korea Braces for Trump 2.0

Of all the US allies and friends around the Indo-Pacific who are feeling nervous about President Trump's return to office, South Korea worries that it may be the most at risk.

It has good reason for concern. Korea’s relationship with the US has underpinned the country’s prosperity and security for the last 75 years. But now Korea feels vulnerable on both counts.

Unlike other US allies in the region, South Korea faces an ongoing belligerent threat (the war with North Korea has never formally ended) and lacks formal regional security ties outside the US alliance, even though Japan is part of the Quad and has been invited to join Pillar II of AUKUS. It is wholly reliant on the US.

Yet Trump has long expressed disdain for alliance relationships.  In his first term, he accused South Korea of free-riding on US security, demanded it pay more for housing US troops, and mused about reducing the US presence on the ground.

At the same time, Trump has blown hot and cold on North Korea, startling South Koreans with alternate prospects of conflict and peace. He started his first term deriding Kim Jong Un as ‘little Rocket Man’ and threatening “fire and fury” on Pyongyang—before switching abruptly to summit diplomacy, strongly supported by then-President Moon Jae-In. Even after his effort to reach an agreement on nuclear weapons fell apart at the Hanoi Summit in 2019, Trump continued to exchange personal notes with Kim. Trump has not forgotten. “It’s nice to get along when somebody has a lot of nuclear weapons or otherwise,” Trump said in July. “I think he misses me.”

No one in Seoul—and possibly not even Trump himself—knows whether he is likely to reach out once again to Kim, and if he does, how Kim may respond. Kim is said to have reacted badly to his colossal loss of face in Hanoi. Yet he may still be open to testing whether Trump, in a friendly mood, might be open to offering relief from the sanctions that bedevil North Korea’s economy.

Under President Biden, both Washington and Seoul have taken a cooler and more stable approach to Pyongyang, but that has made no difference to the steady advance of Kim’s missiles and nuclear weapons. In January, Kim abandoned 80 years of commitment to unifying the peninsula and declared South Korea instead to be the North’s enemy. This month he took the extraordinary step of sending North Korean troops to support Russia’s war with Ukraine. This week, Kim ratified an updated military alliance with Russia, which some say provides the legal justification for sending troops there (fighting Ukrainians in Kursk can be seen as defending Russian territory from attack).

Some in Europe have already criticised Korea for its tepid support for Ukraine, noting that it has indirectly supplied ammunition to Ukraine but has refrained from directly providing lethal weapons. President Yoon faces a tricky decision as to whether he should now escalate support for Ukraine in response to North Korea putting boots on the ground there.

Understandably, South Korean citizens worry that the threat from the North is increasing. Efforts by Biden and President Yoon in the last two years to provide “enhanced deterrence” on the peninsula have failed to reassure them. Now, Trump’s return to the White House has many Koreans wondering again whether their own country should turn nuclear.

Public support for nuclear weapons in principle is strong and growing (around 70% in the latest polls). However, when people face additional questions about the potential costs of nuclear weapons, their support diminishes. Doing so would be a major breach of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and risk UN sanctions, as well as the opprobrium of most of the developed world. This could potentially prompt Japan, a neighbouring country, to consider similar measures.

Awkwardly, it would be impossible for South Korea to develop nuclear weapons secretly. Once a decision is made, the news would quickly leak—creating a political firestorm well before the weapons are deployable. South Korea would also have a challenging time finding the plutonium or enriched uranium required. For these reasons, many think it would be impossible for Korea to embark on such a course without the implicit support of the US. The far-right in Korea harbours hopes that Trump might actually support it.

Korea is also vulnerable economically. Trade makes up 88% of its GDP (for New Zealand, it is 54%). It runs a huge trade surplus with the US (US$44 billion in 2023) and relies on the US as a critical market for high-tech exports such as semiconductors and electric vehicles.

Under Biden, Korean semiconductor giants Samsung and SK Hynix obtained waivers to US restrictions on high-tech chip imports but worry that Trump will not be so sympathetic. They are concerned that Jake Sullivan's "small yard high fence" concept of protection might expand to encompass a wider range of chips. That could force them to exit the China market altogether and to close their large production bases there.

Biden’s signature economic initiative in the region was the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). Trump has promised to end it immediately. Like New Zealand, Korea has supported IPEF. Korea sees particular value in its work on supply chain resilience and is likely to want to continue IPEF even if the US departs.

On top of all of these risks is Trump’s well-known predilection for impulsive, unpredictable, and telegenic actions. Korea has good reason for concern.

Yet, Seoul also has a number of strengths it can use in response.

First, Korea points to its role as a bulwark in the US alliance network, its contribution to US power in the region, and its role in deterring aggression from China and Russia. Trump’s scepticism around alliances seems to be focused on value for money rather than alliances per se. He harshly criticises allies who, in his eyes, do not contribute sufficiently to “burden-sharing.”

On that score, Korea looks pretty good. It currently spends around 2.8% of GDP on defence and boasts what it claims is the world’s fifth most powerful military machine. That 2.8% may not be enough for Trump, but for someone who appreciates raw power, South Korea has a lot to like.

Korea will be heartened by the appointments this week of Marco Rubio and Michael Walz as Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, respectively—both of them hawks on China and supporters of the ROK alliance.

On the economic side, too, Korea has plenty to offer the US. Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs went on social media this week highlighting the $100 billion that Korea has invested in the US since 2021—much of it in Republican states. Korea already buys large amounts of military hardware from the US and is likely to offer to buy more.

So, President Yoon will have some strong cards in his hand when he sits down with Trump. But much may depend on their personal chemistry. Korean media reports that Yoon has taken up his golf clubs for the first time in eight years to prepare for the encounter. He is said to be studying how the late Japanese Prime Minister Abe famously charmed Trump the first time around.

Similar to Abe, Trump will portray himself as a robust conservative leader, championing business interests, and aligning with Yoon in opposing China and Russia. But less helpfully, and unlike Abe, he is not long in office and is already dangerously low in the polls.

Yoon will be on stronger ground in arguing that he has already been doing much of what Trump wants—spending big on defence, investing in US jobs, and taking a hard(ish) line on China. Just before the election, Korea volunteered to further increase its share of the cost of US forces on the peninsula. While Trump may see that as seeking to head him off, Yoon can plausibly say that it was done precisely because Korea is highly aware of his views.

Further in Korea’s favour is that South Korea is likely to be low down the long list of things the new Trump administration will see to “fix.” Internationally, he is likely to have to deal first with Ukraine/Russia, the Middle East, and China. Korea may be able to avoid his gaze for some time.

Yet restlessness and unpredictability are core to Trump’s brand, and it would be foolhardy to rely on avoiding his attention. Trump may not be able to resist following up on his “beautiful friendship” with Kim Jong Un in particular—with consequences no one can guess.

Finally, Koreans are aware that Trump’s inclination to be aggressive is typically followed by equally sudden ‘deals,’ often settled at a level well below the initial demands. In areas such as high-tech manufacturing, trade, and military purchasing, Korea has plenty in its cupboards that could be traded for such a deal when the time is right.

Trump’s unpredictability will keep Koreans on edge. Yoon and his officials know they are likely to be in the firing line at some point and that the opening salvos will be ugly. Yet they are hopeful that the benefits the relationship provides to Washington and the likelihood that Trump will be looking at larger targets than Korea mean the skirmish is likely to be bloody but manageable—and quickly concluded.

-Asia Media Centre