Professor Joseph Liow : Southeast Asia’s Fragile Order

Professor Joseph Liow is one of Singapore’s leading scholars of international affairs.

He’s currently Dean, and Professor in East Asia affairs at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at Singapore’s National University.

Professor Liow has just been in New Zealand as the Asia New Zealand Foundation’s Inaugural Non-Resident Fellow, meeting academic, business and government contacts across a hectic week and multiple cities.    

A region defined by diversity

So, what is Southeast Asia in 2025 ? – he begins by stressing that it’s a collection of many different states – “ten, eleven countries” – that share geography but differ sharply in size, wealth and experience. Over time , he says, “outside powers have repeatedly tried to shape these polities, yet the region has absorbed and localised those external influences, producing the cultural richness we see visible today.”​

He points out that the contrasts are stark: on one end a highly developed city-state like Singapore, on the other, the poorer, still-developing economies such as Laos. Liow notes that religious and political landscapes are equally varied, ranging from Muslim-majority states to Buddhist and Catholic societies, and from liberal democracies to military juntas and single-party regimes – differences that continue to shape how each country views global trends.​

Misunderstandings and great power pressure

When asked whether Southeast Asia is misunderstood from the outside, Liow does not see a single “major misunderstanding” so much as a tendency to gloss over this complexity. He cautions that treating the region as a uniform bloc obscures how different histories of colonialism, nation-building and engagement with the world inform current attitudes to integration, migration, and security.​

On great power rivalry, Liow says the contest between the United States and China appears from Southeast Asia as a dynamic that is “sharper” and more intense than before. He emphasises that most regional states want strong ties with both powers and see each as integral to stability and prosperity, but he worries about growing expectations that they should “choose sides” in a way that feels more like choosing against one power than for another.​

 Hedging, Trump, and an unsettled Indo-Pacific

Liow describes regional strategy as a kind of hedging, where governments work with Washington on some issues and Beijing on others, in an “à la carte” approach that allows mix and match partnerships without closing off options. He warns, however, that how long this remains viable depends heavily on how much pressure the great powers apply to force clearer alignment.​

On U.S. policy, Liow characterises Donald Trump’s worldview as heavily driven by bilateral trade balances rather than regional strategy. In his assessment, Asia’s place in American foreign policy is filtered through whether individual countries run surpluses or deficits with the United States, making it harder to see a coherent Indo-Pacific vision.

New Zealand, ASEAN and small-state strategy

Asia Media Centre Manager, Graeme Acton in conversation with Professor Joseph Liow for AMC's 'Asia Insight Podcast', during his latest visit to New Zealand. Image credits - Asia New Zealand Foundation

Turning to New Zealand, Liow agrees that ties with ASEAN have been improving and argues that this is both logical and important. He explains that ASEAN as an institution has a strong stake in an open global trading system after decades of growth driven by globalisation and integration into supply chains, and he sees New Zealand as a natural partner because of its own dependence on trade.​

Liow suggests that small and medium-sized economies like those in Southeast Asia and New Zealand share a common concern: they do not want to be overwhelmed by trade wars, technological decoupling, or climate disruption generated by larger powers.

In his view, good foreign policy for a country of New Zealand’s size and geography must therefore emphasise openness, connectivity, and active coalition-building with like-minded states to defend and adapt a rules-based economic order.​

Beyond ASEAN: new coalitions and trade frontiers

Liow is careful to say that while ASEAN is a key mechanism, it is not the only one available, and even member states do not treat it as their sole diplomatic vehicle. He stresses that regional diplomacy in practice means layering ASEAN cooperation with other groupings and “minilateral” initiatives among smaller, nimble economies.​

Liow draws a parallel with how a small, early trade arrangement among a few states eventually evolved into the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), arguing that many major economic frameworks begin as modest experiments among a limited group of willing partners.​

Order, disorder, and the return of great power politics

Much of Professor Liow’s academic work has explored the idea of “order” in international politics. He notes that debates often revolve around whether order rests on power, norms, values, or a mixture of all three. “What we are seeing in 2025 is the resurfacing of classic great power politics that is straining the post–Second World War arrangements that helped manage relations and support globalisation” he says.

Liow warns that while this system was never perfect, its erosion risks pushing the world towards a situation where might makes right and smaller states are reduced to “price takers” with little influence over the rules they live under. He does not foresee total anarchy, but is concerned about whether medium and small countries will still feel secure and able to pursue their own interests in a more hard-edged environment.​ Preserving some sort of system under which these states retain some agency he believes will be a central challenge in the coming decades.

Old and new authoritarianism

Asked about authoritarianism in Asia, Liow harks back to “Blood and Silk”, the 2017 book by Michael Vatikiotis, echoing the theme that the situation we see today is a blend of old and new, not a complete break with the past. “Historical polities in Southeast Asia past centuries were not democratic in the modern sense; elite decisions about religion or rule could transform entire countries overnight, with little popular support or consultation.”​

He explains that democratic ideas and institutions arrived through colonial rule and Enlightenment thought, shaping local elites and political cultures but never fully displacing older hierarchical norms. For Liow, the resulting mix produces today’s landscape, in which the region hosts everything from liberal democracies to absolute monarchies, single-party systems and military juntas – all coexisting within Southeast Asia’s borders.​

Islam, identity, and extremism

Liow has written extensively on Islam in Southeast Asia and says that over the past two decades he has seen a noticeable strengthening of religious identity among Muslims. He notes changes in everyday behaviour, from dress and greetings to stricter observance of religious practices, as well as a greater desire to bring religious commitments into public life and politics.​

In the region’s largest Muslim nation, Indonesia, he explains that the idea of an “Islamic state” is not monolithic: some parties seek to expand Islamic law within the existing system, others dream of a caliphate that transcends the modern nation-state, and a small minority has pursued violent routes.

The most virulent of these was of course Jemaah Islamiyah, the group held responsible for the Bali bombing in 2002.

JI was in contact with the Al Qaeda group headed by Osama Bin Laden, and Liow links the attraction in Indonesia of the Islamic State terrorist group in Syria and Iraq to social media propaganda, sympathetic teachers, appeals to religious duty, and in some cases even the lure of excitement. “These were very small groups though, tiny pockets in a vast and diverse country” he says. 

JI leaders announced the group was dissolving ​in 2024. In a video statement JI's senior council and the leaders of the group's affiliated Islamic boarding schools said they “have agreed to declare the dissolution of the JI and return to Indonesia's embrace”.

Indonesia and Malaysia: identity politics in motion

On whether radical currents will always “bubble under” in Indonesia, Liow stresses the country’s enormous geographic scale and internal diversity, including multiple Islamic traditions and forms of activism. Given this complexity and the ease with which ideas now cross borders online, he says it is unsurprising that small extremist pockets will continue to emerge, even if they do not threaten the state as a whole.​

He contrasts this with Malaysia, where he argues that religion and politics are tightly interwoven with ethnicity. Liow explains that affirmative action policies favouring Malay Muslims and the ideology of Malay primacy, or ketuanan Melayu, have deeply shaped the political psyche, and because being Malay is constitutionally tied to being Muslim, ethnic dominance easily becomes religious dominance. He notes that contemporary Malaysian politics is marked by both non-Malay challenges to this order and internal Malay debates between more conservative and more pluralist visions of the country.​

A fellowship bridging New Zealand and Southeast Asia

Speaking about his role as the Asia New Zealand Foundation’s inaugural non-resident fellow, Liow calls the appointment an honour and describes the programme as both “wonderful” and necessary. He says his week in New Zealand has been shaped by conversations with business leaders, academics and officials, where he has tried to share Southeast Asian perspectives while also listening closely to how New Zealanders see developments in his region.​

For Liow, the value of the fellowship lies in this two-way flow: he wants to return to Singapore and the wider region with a better sense of New Zealand’s outlook, not only for his own understanding but to help build awareness among colleagues and policymakers at home. He sees that exchange as part of a broader effort by like-minded, outward-looking states to find stability amid global uncertainty and disruption.​

Asked finally whether he is optimistic or pessimistic about Southeast Asia’s political future, Liow describes himself, as a “good Singaporean,” as fundamentally pragmatic. He leans toward optimism, but he insists that leaders must be realistic about the challenges they face and honest about what can and cannot be achieved collectively, whether it be through ASEAN or other groupings.​

He argues that even in a climate of sharpening great power rivalry, Southeast Asia has room to show that it is valuable enough to both the United States and China that neither should force a blunt choice upon it.

To do that, he says, regional states must rediscover the ability to hold a “middle space,” engaging both powers while working together more coherently and urgently at home – because, in his judgement, “deepening rivalry serves none of the region’s countries well, regardless of their culture, wealth, or political system.​”

In the banner photo (from left to right) - Jason Young, Associate Professor in Political Science and International Relations and Director at the New Zealand Contemporary China Research Centre at Victoria University of Wellington, Professor Joseph Liow, and Dr Julia Macdonald, Director of Research and Engagement at the Asia New Zealand Foundation. Image credits - Asia New Zealand Foundation.

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