Looking Beyond the “Foreign Hand” in Pakistan's Security Crisis

Pakistan has faced a fresh wave of violence this month, concentrated in Balochistan, where the state has launched Operation Shaban to counter the attacks that began on July 5, when militants ambushed a police checkpoint guarding the Mangi Dam construction site in Ziarat district, killing nine police officers and abducting several more, one of three coordinated assaults across the province that week that together killed 42 people, mostly security personnel. That surge came on the back of an already brutal June, with108 attacks nationwide and 262 deaths, including 184 militants, 52 civilians and 26 security personnel.

While the south and west seethe with terrorist violence, unrest has been building in the north for more than a month now. Pakistan-administered Kashmir, or Azad Kashmir as it is known domestically, has been the site of strikes, sit-ins and clashes since early June, when the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC) led a region-wide shut down over a charter of economic and constitutional demands. The latest reports put the death toll at 28, with Rangers deployed in force, internet and mobile networks cut for days, and hundreds detained.

The Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee, which has led the protest movement, has been proscribed under terrorism laws. The AJK government has alleged that the group has links to anti-state elements backed by India, and has accused it of causing losses of Rs15 billion to the state through the unrest.

Attributing terrorist violence to foreign involvement is a recurring theme in Pakistan's national security and foreign policy discourse. The state has, at various points, pointed to India and Afghanistan as contributors to the violence it faces. Last year, for instance, the government designated terrorist groups operating in Balochistan collectively as "Fitna-al-Hindustan."

While Pakistan has long accused India of supporting insurgent groups in Balochistan, New Delhi rejects these claims. India, in turn, levels similar charges against Pakistan regarding Kashmir, allegations Islamabad also denies. Independent verification of such cross-border involvement remains challenging amid competing narratives.

While this is not to deny the plausible involvement of hostile foreign elements in fomenting terrorism and supporting terrorist networks, blaming the entire situation on just one element might be reductive.

A similar dynamic plays out in the tribal belt and KPK, where the state has conducted airstrikes against Afghan Taliban positions, with reports of civilian infrastructure damage in some instances. As with Balochistan, Islamabad attributes much of the cross-border violence to the Afghan Taliban's alleged sheltering of the TTP and its failure to curb attacks originating from its territory. Again, this is not to deny that the Afghan Taliban regime is not responsible for this. The UN has also documented its support for the TTP. But can the state just absolve itself of all responsibility and blame a foreign entity and in certain cases bomb it? Again, that would be an overly simplistic reading of a much complex problem.

The fact is that Pakistan hasn’t found itself in this quagmire overnight. This has been decades in the making. Framing the violence in Balochistan, where the BLA and BLF now increasingly target civilians, solely as hostile state-sponsored terrorism risks overlooking important context. Decades of state policy in the province, including allegations of enforced disappearances and disputes over resource distribution, have contributed to the current situation. These grievances are documented by domestic and international rights organizations. Balochistan's relationship with the federal government has also long been marked by limited provincial autonomy over its resources and political representation.

It is a similar story in the tribal areas and KPK. Decades of war, military operations, displacement and broken promises have worn people down and eroded trust in the state.

In Kashmir too, genuine political representation has never taken root. Decisions affecting the region have frequently been shaped in Islamabad, with local consent playing a secondary role. While the movement began around economic grievances, sections of it have increasingly framed their demands in constitutional and political terms, reflecting a broader erosion of trust in state institutions.

These are not isolated incidents but a consistent pattern in how the state has governed its constituent units for decades. The violence Pakistan faces today is, in large part, the accumulated cost of that neglect and heavy-handed policy.

That is not to say military operations are wrong and should be halted or that the state should not call out foreign meddling through diplomatic channels. But rather than treating terrorism as a monolithic foreign sponsored problem, a nuanced approach is needed which will have to start with self-reflection and accountability.

Perhaps what Pakistan needs is a renewed social contract with regions and people’s which are currently fighting the state. That would mean leading with politics of reconciliation and initiation of dialogue. It would also include an honest reckoning and acknowledgement of the wrongs committed by the state over the decades followed by reparations and rehabilitation. Perhaps Pakistan can learn from the Truth and Reconciliation commission in post-apartheid South Africa.

The state has demonstrated its capacity for hard power, through crackdowns on militants domestically and cross-border operations. Yet history suggests that military approaches alone are rarely sufficient; durable outcomes typically require political settlement alongside security measures. No war goes on forever. The militants, too, will eventually have to come to the table. Pakistan has already lost enough lives. It cannot afford to lose more.

-Asia Media Centre