Law Must Replace Force in South China Sea, Demands International Forum

The conference, themed “Unity in Uncertainties,” gathered nearly 50 expert speakers, 11 ambassadors, and over 300 delegates from close to 40 countries, serving as a critical non-official barometer for a region increasingly defined by seismic geopolitical shifts.

DAV President Dr. Nguyen Hung Son and Deputy Foreign Minister H.E. Nguyen Manh Cuong opened the forum by emphasising that the post-WWII global legal order is showing alarming signs of "erosion." Mr. Cuong warned that the world is "more fragile than ever," with the South China Sea acting as a direct mirror to this global turbulence.

The sheer scale of regional instability was quantified by operational data presented by delegates: in the first ten months of 2025 alone, claimants engaged in clashes at flashpoints including Scarborough Shoal, Sabina Shoal, and Sandy Cay, while recording more than 100 unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral military exercises. These aggressive actions, according to the consensus of the forum, have critically increased the risk of "miscalculation and misunderstanding" among navies and coast guards.

UNCLOS: The 'Non-Negotiable' Anchor

Amidst this escalating aggression, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was repeatedly and unequivocally affirmed by regional coastal states as the singular, non-negotiable legal framework.

Deputy Foreign Minister Cuong stated clearly that Vietnam "supports the central role of international law, especially the 1982 UNCLOS, and commits to peaceful dispute settlement and responsible management of differences." This commitment to legal order, delegates stressed, is the only sustainable path forward.

Demonstrating this commitment to multilateral maritime law, Vietnam highlighted its pride in being among the first 60 nations to ratify the Agreement on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction (the BBNJ Agreement), reflecting its deep, enduring commitment to the international legal ecosystem.

Viet Nam’s Deputy Foreign Minister, H.E. Mr Nguyen Manh Cuong, noted that “we live in an era where uncertainty is the new norm.” Photo: AMC

Grey-Zone Warfare and the Weaponisation of Information

The reality on the water, as presented in the forum’s opening sessions, painted a far more volatile picture than most official diplomatic statements suggest. The panel titled “A Reality of (Un)Stable Sea?” presented a grounded, evidence-based assessment of the current situation, drawing on the latest incident-tracking data, satellite imagery, and official reports.

Analysts argued that beneath the surface of negotiations lies a campaign of coercive manoeuvres—anchored not in open conflict, but in tactics designed to blur facts, test limits, and slowly shift the regional status quo.

Australian academic Dr Bec Strating highlighted that the conflict now operates within an “informational grey zone,” where “truth and fiction blur,” making information itself a strategic and political weapon. China’s grey-zone strategy leverages its expansive claims and non-lethal coercive actions—including maritime blockades, water cannons, and the deployment of massive maritime militia fleets—to alter the regional status quo without triggering a direct military response.

This strategy, experts noted, is designed to progressively establish the principle of effectivités, or effective control, to advance its political claims and challenge the international rules-based order. The scale of this coercion is already having tangible economic consequences, with substantial financial losses reported across the fishing and energy sectors of Southeast Asia.

In response to this legal and informational warfare, Philippine Coast Guard Spokesperson Commodore Jay Tarriela outlined Manila’s key strategic countermeasure: transparency. Rather than retaliate or remain silent in the face of Chinese provocations, the Philippines has strategically chosen to publicise them.

During the forum, Tarriela presented photos and videos from the Philippine Coast Guard showing Chinese coast guard ships, over 100 Chinese maritime militia vessels, and jet flyovers—all recorded within the Philippines’ 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), also known as the West Philippine Sea.

Commodore Jay Tarriela of the Philippine Coast Guard presented footage of Chinese militia vessels swarming the West Philippine Sea and harassing Filipino fisherfolk. Photo: DAV

By sharing these materials and including media in some of the Coast Guard’s patrols, the Philippines has aimed to provide transparency for its own citizens, helping them understand the growing tension in national waters. This “less aggressive and non-retaliatory” approach, Tarriela explained, has effectively reframed China’s manoeuvring in the West Philippine Sea as “illegal, coercive, aggressive, and deceptive.”

Since implementing this strategy, the Philippines has successfully captured international attention. “Since the transparency initiative, countries like New Zealand, Australia, and the EU have started calling out China,” Tarriela said.

Ray Powell, Director of Project Sealight at Stanford University, referred to this approach as “aggressive transparency.” While effective, he noted that it comes at a reputational cost—for both sides. The goal, he argued, is to make “the aggressor pay for the reputational cost of aggression,” by repeatedly exposing actions that violate international law.

Powell and Tarriela both highlighted that this strategy has helped shift the Philippines’ defence posture. Once focused primarily on internal conflicts, the country is now embracing a more archipelagic defence strategy to counter external threats. As a result, the Philippine government has succeeded in persuading its citizens of the need to fund national security and modernise its defence capabilities—even as this means diverting some resources away from social services.

Internationally, the messaging has also strengthened the Philippines’ security partnerships, leading to new defence pacts with New Zealand, Canada, Australia, and member states of the European Union.

Tarriela admitted that the original goal of the transparency campaign was to encourage China to scale back its aggressive actions. For a brief period, he said, this seemed to be working. But eventually, the situation worsened. “Beijing’s actions have only become more assertive,” he said.

Dr Yinan Bao, research fellow at the Huayang Centre for Maritime Cooperation and Ocean Governance in China, countered that transparency was not effective and that exercising restraint was essential—particularly for countries directly involved in maritime disputes.

However, Tarriela pushed back, emphasising that the South China Sea is not a regional matter limited to claimant countries. It is an international waterway, he said, and China’s actions amount to violations of international law. “This is a challenge for all,” he concluded.

Great Power Postures

Beyond the disputes between China and Southeast Asian claimant states, the South China Sea also sits at the heart of great-power rivalry. While the United States, though not a claimant, traditionally asserts its interests through alliances—particularly with the Philippines—China leverages its economic power to divide Southeast Asian nations and dilute ASEAN's collective stance in pursuit of its regional ambitions.

A session titled “Great Powers’ Strategic (Un)ambiguities?” examined the increasing visibility of major players projecting power in the region. This includes the rising frequency of maritime patrols, military exercises, and joint deployments—often described as a modern “gunboat show.”

The evolving role of the United States under its current administration has introduced a new layer of strategic instability. Henrietta Levin of CSIS in Washington observed that while U.S. goals, posture, and military activities in 2025—including Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs)—have remained largely consistent, there has been a notable shift in political messaging.

“President Trump does not seem to have raised South China Sea issues in his engagements with President Xi over the course of this year,” Levin pointed out. This presidential silence, despite a sustained military presence, has been interpreted by some as a form of strategic ambiguity—one that risks enabling China’s continued grey-zone expansion.

The Chinese perspective, presented by Dr Zhao Minghao of Peking University, characterised the growing U.S. military presence in the Philippines as a “major concern for Beijing,” largely viewed through the lens of a potential Taiwan contingency. Dr Zhao noted the Trump administration is simultaneously enhancing its long-range strike capabilities while expecting U.S.–China relations to evolve into a new modus vivendi, even amidst rising tensions.

From a regional standpoint, Dr Tang Siew Mun of the Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore emphasised the importance of ASEAN centrality, warning that “countries should not be pushed so hard and so far,” as they will ultimately need space to navigate disputes through established dialogue mechanisms.

In the context of U.S.–China dynamics, Dr Tang stressed the need to prioritise the interests of ASEAN claimant states. He urged great powers to show empathy towards smaller nations that bear the direct consequences of superpower competition. Photo: AMC

A 'Paralysed' Code of Conduct

The conference's urgent focus on UNCLOS was further sharpened by deep scepticism over the stalled ASEAN-China Code of Conduct (COC). Delegates warned that the negotiation process, aiming for a 2026 conclusion, is effectively paralysed over fundamental, and likely irreconcilable, disagreements.

The critical sticking points remain over whether the COC will be a legally binding treaty or merely a non-binding set of guidelines. This is compounded by deep contention over the geographic scope of its application, a fraught issue given China's expansive 'nine-dash line' claim. Furthermore, negotiations are snagged on China's insistence on clauses that would prohibit external military activity and bar claimant states from resource development with non-regional partners.

Several panellists noted that China's proposed restrictions, in particular, are seen as a non-starter by many ASEAN members. Agreeing to them would effectively mean ceding foreign policy autonomy and granting Beijing a veto over their sovereign rights to conduct military exercises and pursue economic partnerships within their own legally-defined Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs).

-Asia Media Centre