Is Japan remilitarizing – and if so what does it mean for New Zealand?

Since her elevation to the highest office last October, Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi has rapidly embarked on a wide-ranging effort to expand Japan’s security and military capability, including revising Japan’s “peace constitution”.  Her visit to Australia last week to strengthen defence ties (noticeably not coming on to New Zealand), came two weeks after announcing the sale of the first three of a planned 11 Mogami-class frigates to Australia – ships in which New Zealand’s navy is also interested.  Should New Zealand be concerned about this military expansion, or should we be following Japan’s – and Australia’s – example? There is little chance of Japan returning to pre-1945 militarism;  the question is rather how we react to Japan becoming a more conventionally capable strategic power in response to regional pressures.

Takaichi has brought forward to this year her predecessor’s promise to raise spending on defence to 2% of GDP.  She has loosened restrictions on defence exports, spurred a renascence of Japan’s long-dormant military manufacturing, and launched a review aimed at toughening up Japan’s three national security documents.  Most dramatically, she has launched a campaign for constitutional revision, accelerating trends already visible under previous leaders Abe and Kishida.  While she has not provided details on what that will entail, it is likely to include revising Article 9.  Imposed by the US after World War II, Article 9 famously – and uniquely - renounces the right to wage war and the threat or use of force as means of settling disputes, as well as the right to keep an army, navy and air force (the current organizations are euphemistically described as ‘Self-Defence Forces’). 

Former PM Abe pushed the boundaries of Article 9 by declaring that it did not prevent Japan from exercising the right to collective self-defence (ie helping others defend themselves).   The unspoken question today is whether such self-defence might include supporting Taiwan in a conflict with China.  Whether by design or slip of the tongue, Takaichi told the Diet last year that a Chinese naval blockade of Taiwan would directly threaten Japan’s survival and justify collective self-defence (ie acting with the US).

While Takaichi said no more in public than the government had long been thinking, the statement provoked a fierce response from China, including retaliation against tourism and restrictions on rare earths.  Many Japanese academics consider Japan-China ties to be at their lowest point in decades, with a virtual shutdown of all discussions and exchanges. With even unofficial dialogue hard to access, the situation is open to further escalation. 

China is not letting up on the rhetoric.  When a Japanese frigate sailed through the Taiwan Straits last month China warned that Japan was “playing with fire”, and to “step back from the brink”.  During Takaichi’s visit to Australia last week, China’s Global Times described Japan’s initiatives as “a calculated attempt to contain China's influence …stoking bloc confrontation and forming exclusive cliques.” China maintains that Japan is taking advantage of what Beijing sees as a power vacuum created by the contraction of      US power in  North Asia to expand its political, diplomatic, and military influence in the region. 

Yet where China complains of Japan ‘containing’ China’s rise, Japan sees an increasingly worrisome military and economic power imbalance with its neighbour.  China is making threats not just about disputed territories in the South and East China Sea but recently even about Japan’s control of Okinawa.  In Japan’s view, China is not simply exercising coercion against a neighbour, but is trying to drive a wedge between Japan and the US at a time of increasing scepticism, both inside the US and outside, about the US’ preparedness to come to the aid of long-term allies. 

Takaichi’s response is to shore up the US relationship as far as possible  – she turned her charm on President Trump once again in visiting the White House in March – while hedging her bets by simultaneously building up Japan’s own ability to defend itself. 

In 2001, Japan’s economy was three times greater than China's.  Today China is at least four times larger than Japan (more if measured in PPP terms).  In terms of defence spending, Japan spent twice as much as China in 2001; today that proportion is more than reversed, with China spending 3-4 times as much as Japan, and maintaining two million people in military uniform compared to Japan’s 240,000.  The Takaichi government sees its current efforts as scrambling to recover lost ground and to build a minimum capacity of deterrence, not to dominate anyone else.

The rise of China, the weakening of the US’ commitment to the international order, and the reconfiguration of global economic power are transforming the geopolitical landscape, creating big questions for everyone in the region including New Zealand.   When Singapore fell to the Japanese in 1942 we ditched our reliance on the UK in favour of buying insurance from the US.  Worried about the risks of a resurgent Japan – and of communism – New Zealand and Australia demanded the US provide security guarantees (the ANZUS alliance) to justify ending the occupation of Japan by US (and Kiwi and Aussie) forces.  Today those earlier concerns have largely receded, replaced by a hard dilemma about how to position ourselves between our largest economic partner and our most powerful – but increasingly unpredictable – security partner.

While Takaichi seems more comfortable than PM Albanese about getting close to Trump, Australia is strongly supporting Japan’s approach, and making itself an increasingly indispensable – and more equal - security partner. 

The relationship is not just about military hardware – given the urgency of the Iran war crisis, discussions in Canberra covered energy and economic security as well as frigates.  Yet both fundamentally agree on the need to strengthen deterrence against threats to the regional order, and not just from China - think Russia, North Korea and Iran as starters.

Where is New Zealand in this situation?  The fact that Takaichi — and immediately before her EU Commission President von der Leyen, Canadian PM Carney and Indonesian President Prabowo — travelled to Canberra but not Wellington may suggest New Zealand is becoming strategically less central in key diplomatic conversations, although there may also be more practical explanations for those decisions.   If the latter, then New Zealand needs to work harder to create value for such visitors.  PM Luxon has not hosted a leader from outside the Pacific Islands since Australia’s Albanese in August last year.   Foreign Minister Peters has doggedly followed a pro-US stance - and been criticized for having little to show for it – yet it emerged last week that Luxon had pushed for a stronger pro-US position on the Iran war than Peters. 

A poll earlier this year showed that significant majorities in Britain, Canada, Germany and France – all traditional friends of New Zealand – now believe it is “better to depend on China than the US”.  What does New Zealand think? By the standards of most countries New Zealand has a fair degree of agency and choice in the current situation – to tilt towards China, steer a middle path, or maintain our current pro-US stance.  Yet our three-way coalition government seems divided, undecided or unwilling to discuss      the issue publicly.  Close regional friends Japan and Australia have settled on a clear direction and, for better or worse, are bounding ahead of us.  At the very least New Zealanders deserve a more transparent debate among our policy elites about where we stand.

Banner image: JS Haguro (DDG-180), right, sails alongside the Italian Navy’s ITS Raimondo Montecuccoli (P432) and the U.S. Navy’s USS Princeton (CG-59) during Rim of the Pacific Exercise 2024 in the Pacific Ocean on 12 July 2024. The image highlights Japan’s growing role in regional security and its close defence cooperation with international partners. Image: U.S. Navy / Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Larissa T. Dougherty via Wikimedia Commons.

-Asia media Centre