China’s 80th Victory Parade: Power, Optics, and Global Dilemmas

An alternative world?

Shoulder to shoulder, Xi Jinping welcomed Russian President Vladimir Putin, a familiar face from the 70th anniversary parade in 2015. But the real shock came with the appearance of North Korea’s reclusive leader Kim Jong-un, emerging from isolation to witness the spectacle.

Dressed in a Mao-style grey suit, Xi hailed his troops as they marched across Tiananmen Square, declaring them on the path to becoming a “world-class military.” He cast China as “unstoppable,” proclaiming: “The Chinese nation is a great nation that does not fear power and intimidation and is determined to stand self-reliant and strong.” His words thundered alongside an 80-gun salute and the raising of China’s flags.

Three leaders—labelled in the West as strongmen and dictators—stood tall at what Beijing framed as an “anti-fascist victory parade.” The symbolism was clear, echoing as loudly as the cannon fire.

Washington noticed.

Donald Trump fired back on Truth Social, accusing the trio of “conspiring against America.” At a White House press conference, he said he had watched the parade closely, stressing that if the commemoration were truly about China’s liberation from Imperia Japan in WWII, Beijing should have acknowledged the role of the United States in securing that freedom—something, he said, Xi conspicuously failed to do.

Responding to Trump’s remarks, the Kremlin insisted that “no one is plotting anything.”

But Europe was not convinced. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas called the Beijing gathering a “direct challenge to the international system built on rules… It’s not just symbolic.”

Sanctions cast a long shadow over the spectacle. Russia remains punished for its war in Ukraine, North Korea for its nuclear weapons programme. Their alignment has gone beyond optics—last year, Kim Jong-un even dispatched 15,000 troops to aid Russia’s invasion.

Analysts say Beijing’s decision to stand so openly with Moscow and Pyongyang was no accident, but a signal of defiance. “Beijing is sending a message … that even if Western countries continue to sanction Russia over the Russia-Ukraine war, Beijing will not be afraid to stand by its friend,” said Wen-Ti Sung, a non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub.

This image of solidarity has led some Western analysts to dub the three an “Axis of Upheaval.” That perception only grew with the presence of other sanctioned leaders in Beijing, among them Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian, Myanmar’s junta chief Min Aung Hlaing, and Belarus’s dictator Alexander Lukashenko.

Military parade or a marketing campaign?

The parade also served as a platform for Beijing to display its modernising arsenal to the world. Beyond rousing national pride, the event sent a message of defiance to Washington and its allies, showcasing an arsenal designed to blunt US power in Asia.

Front and centre were weapons that mark a leap in China’s strategic reach: the DF-61 intercontinental ballistic missile, the JL-1 air-launched nuclear weapon, and a new generation of hypersonic missiles such as the DF-26D also known as the “Guam Killer."

The DF-61, a mobile ICBM, signals Beijing’s determination to build a more resilient nuclear deterrent, one capable of striking faraway targets. With the JL-1 and the submarine-launched JL-3 also on display, analysts say China is edging closer to a full nuclear triad—land, sea, and air—long dominated by the United States.

The Global Times, a Chinese state-run media outlet, reported that the DF-26 series which stands for "Dong Feng" (East Wind), is designed to target the “second island chain”—a US-aligned defence line stretching from Japan’s Bonin Islands, through the Mariana Islands (including Guam), and down to Palau.

Military expert Shao Yongling explained that the missile is a medium- to long-range ballistic weapon capable of reaching Guam. She added that the DF-26D, unveiled on Wednesday, is the latest upgrade in the series and is officially classified as a hypersonic ballistic missile.

While most of Japan’s territory lies within the first island chain, its outlying islands extend into the second, placing them within the missile’s range. The DF-26D’s inclusion in the parade highlighted China’s growing focus on long-range strike capabilities and its intention to counter United States' military presence in the Pacific.

The newly developed DF-26 missile series was unveiled at the 80th Victory Parade, following the debut of its earlier model in 2015. Photo: Wiki Commons

But the spectacle went beyond missiles. Swarms of unmanned and AI-powered systems also rolled past Tiananmen Square: the underwater drones like the AJX002, combat aerial drones, and even four-legged “robot wolves.” China is betting heavily on autonomous warfare, hoping to overwhelm adversaries with sheer numbers and machine-driven precision.

Alongside them came countermeasures—anti-drone lasers and micro-missile systems—highlighting a strategy not only to wield the technology but to defend against it.

Experts note that China’s military AI push is powered by universities and private tech giants, advancing with fewer ethical and regulatory brakes than the US. A newly unveiled cyberspace unit confirmed Beijing’s intent to fight future wars not just on land, sea, and air, but in digital domains too.

The presence of Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un at Xi Jinping’s side gave the parade the feel of a high-stakes arms exhibition. For sanctioned states unable to access Western defence markets, China positioned itself as an alternative supplier.

Advanced missiles, drones, and untested technologies were paraded not only for global rivals to see, but for potential customers. According to the Wallstreet Journal, the parade doubled as a show of strength and a sales campaign for China’s arsenal.

To be or not to be in Beijing? That is the question

Apart from 26 world leaders, 70 special guests joined Beijing’s military parade, and among them were New Zealand’s former prime ministers Helen Clark and Sir John Key, who both shook hands with Xi Jinping on arrival.

Once political opponents, they stood together as unlikely parade companions.

Clark told Stuff her decision to attend was “a line call,” emphasising that she covered her own expenses. Asked about standing alongside authoritarian leaders, she admitted the choice was difficult but pointed out that “many friends of New Zealand,” including Australia, were also represented.

Screenshot taken from AP’s live stream of the military parade.

China’s Ambassador to New Zealand, Wang Xiaolong, praised Clark and Key on X (former Twitter), highlighting the two countries’ shared history in WWII and describing the pair as long-serving leaders during “some of the best years” of China–NZ relations.

In her piece on Newsroom, political scientist Anna Marie Brady argues the optics are damaging. Xi’s ambition, she writes, is to build an alternative order that rejects the rules-based system in favour of “shows of force and illiberal solidarity.” In that light, the presence of democratic leaders such as Clark and Key is not symbolic—it is “deeply consequential.”

She notes that the Communist Party downplays the sacrifices of Kuomintang soldiers, who bore the brunt of fighting the Imperial Japanese forces in the Second World War.

By attending, Clark and Key risk endorsing a skewed version of history and granting legitimacy to authoritarian narratives. Their presence, Brady concludes, blurs the moral line between democracies and authoritarian states, normalises China’s rewriting of history, and risks leaving the two former leaders seen as inadvertently lending credibility to an authoritarian display.

The enemy of my enemy is my friend

Behind the display of solidarity, analysts warn the “united front” is less solid than it appears. The ties between China, Russia, and North Korea are often described as a “marriage of convenience” rather than a true alliance. They share a goal of challenging US influence, but their reasons for doing so are very different.

For China, the focus is on keeping its borders stable, securing cheap Russian energy, and letting Moscow’s war in Ukraine distract the United States.

Russia, crippled by sanctions, relies on China to keep its economy and war effort alive. North Korea, meanwhile, gains money, recognition, and—most importantly—a diplomatic shield. With China and Russia both holding permanent seats and veto power at the UN Security Council, Pyongyang knows it has protectors against the harshest international actions.

Still, there are clear points of tension. China has long been uneasy about Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions and has at times backed sanctions. Russia, for its part, remains wary of China’s growing influence in Central Asia and quietly fears Beijing’s long-term ambitions.

The parade, then, was less a portrait of enduring trust than of tactical alignment—a calculated show of unity designed for maximum effect. Behind the pageantry, it remains a partnership built on necessity more than conviction.

China’s 80th Victory Parade was more than military theatre. It was a calculated projection of strength, a showcase of modern weapons, and a stage for contested diplomacy. For Beijing, it reinforced national pride and signalled resilience; for critics, it raised concerns about authoritarian solidarity and historical revisionism.

For democracies, the challenge is not simply to dismiss the spectacle but to interpret it—reading the symbols, weighing the optics, and judging the messages behind the display. When the parade ended, what remained was the task of making sense of its broader meaning — a commemoration of the past, a demonstration of present power, and a statement about the future direction of the global order.

 -Asia Media Centre